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THE ISCIP ANALYST 
Volume 16, Number 5, Part 1 (November 12, 2009) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
Waiting for the other shoe 
Russian political life seems a mash of contradiction and mixed metaphor at the 
moment, particularly when juxtaposed with the 1989 “fall of the wall” 
commemorations.  At that time, the leader of the Soviet Union was the head of a 
one-party state, who somehow recognized that the aggregation of propagandistic 
slogans extolling the merits of the Soviet system (not to mention the economic 
drain of the system) could not withstand the pressure of realism just beyond its 
borders.  Events in modern Russia, however, have caused the one-time Soviet 
leader to warn of the dangers looming when a regime’s PR can’t approximate its 
reality.  Nonetheless, the current Russian president continues to declare electoral 
fraud a “precise reflection of political forces.” (1) 
 
Following the October 16 elections in Russia—the results of which were met with 
a walk-out by the opposition parties in the Duma— former Soviet President 
Mikhail Gorbachev declared, "In everyone's eyes, the elections turned into a 
mockery of the people and showed a deep disrespect for their voices. … The 
party of power gained the result it needed by discrediting political institutions and 
the very party itself." (2) 
 
It is not exactly the “mishandling” of electoral results per se that has created this 
public discomfit (perhaps some vote manipulation is to be expected), but rather 
the consequential walk-out by deputies, perhaps at the encouragement of the 
Kremlin, has called attention to the vacancy of the process and disregard for the 
underlying principle of elections, in favor of the perfunctory nod to form:  elections 
are held, the party of power wins, and the results accord with all the publicized 
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opinion polls shown on state-controlled television.  This may not be the 
democracy envisioned in 1989, but times have changed.  Or have they? 
President Medvedev, whose own election owes much to Russia’s carefully 
controlled political and media spectacles, has grown more and more vocal as a 
putative reformer over the course of his eighteen months in office.  
 
In his November 12 address to the Federal Assembly, President Medvedev 
emphasized the need to modernize Russia, most pointedly the economy: 
"Instead of a primitive economy based on raw materials, we shall create a smart 
economy, producing unique knowledge, new goods and technologies, goods and 
technologies useful for people." (3)  Management of the economy has been 
fundamentally the purview of the Russian government, and as such, Medvedev’s 
remarks may reveal tension with or imply criticism of Prime Minister Putin.   
Nonetheless, there does not appear to be another personality to rival Putin who 
might lead the government. 
 
Medvedev’s address also noted a malaise more prevalent than Russia’s 
economic foundation: "Instead of an archaic society, in which leaders think and 
decide for everybody, we shall become a society of intelligent, free and 
responsible people." (4) 
 
The president’s address to the Federal Assembly echoes similar critiques laid out 
in a Manifesto—a call for dialogue in preparation of his address to the Federal 
Assembly—published in August.  (5) 
 
In the Manifesto, as well as in various other expressions this year, Medvedev has 
identified certain key hobgoblins to real reform in Russia: Corruption, official and 
otherwise; Criminal activity, including drug smuggling; the undermining of state 
structures by Oligarchs’ dogged pursuit of self-interest (and, in general, Oligarch 
ties to state businesses); and even the overly close connections between leading 
state officials and large state industries.   
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As for strictly political critiques of current day Russia, Medvedev’s Manifesto was 
clear: “Democratic institutions have, on the whole, been formed and stabilized, 
but their quality is very far from ideal. The civil society is weak and the level of 
self-organization and self-government is low.” (6) And yes, he should know.  It 
was exactly the weakness of these institutions that allowed his rise from “First 
Deputy Successor” to President.  
 
Medvedev has been holding out the hope, however, the he is a reformer.  He not 
only can identify the problems besetting Russia’s leadership, he has a vision for 
a better Russian political future: “As in the majority of democratic states, the 
leaders in the political struggle will be parliamentary parties that periodically 
replace each other in power. Parties and coalitions thereof will form the federal 
and regional organs of executive power (not the other way around) and nominate 
candidates for the post of head of state and regional and local government 
leaders. They will have long experience of civilized political competition. And of 
responsible and meaningful interaction with voters, of interparty cooperation, and 
of seeking compromise options for solutions to the most acute social problems.” 
(7) 
 
There has been a building anticipation this year that the Medvedev-Putin diarchy 
would engage in a political scuffle, as Medvedev maneuvered for more authority 
to enact some type of reforms.  Medvedev chooses rhetoric that feeds this 
expectation (even if not consistently), and his advisers publicly posit the means 
of Medvedev’s success in the face of a Putin-centric siloviki in control of the 
major levers of power.  (8)  For many months, it had appeared as though the 
battleground would focus on corruption, particularly within the offices of state 
officials – the apparatchiki.  The truly taxing issue of just who would be 
investigated does not yet seem to have been broached as the corruption probes 
bog down in the murk of ownership of the process: Who should investigate?  
Who would oversee the investigators?  Progress, in the form of prosecutions of 
leading officials in high-level offices, has not materialized. 
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In the wake of the October 16 elections, and, in particular given the president’s 
defense of fraud in the electoral process as nonetheless producing a legitimate 
result, Medvedev’s reform credentials continue to fade and his inaction 
disappoints a populace whose expectations he seemed determined to raise.  
 
No wonder Putin has been so quiet of late.  He gains nothing by stepping into 
this spectacle of rhetoric freed from action. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “Interview with Der Spiegel,” 7 Nov 09, Russian President’s Website via 
http://www.kremlin.ru/text/speeches/2009/11/07/1230_type82916_222598.shtml. 
(2) “Gorbachev raps Russia's "mockery" of democracy,” 19 Oct 09, Reuters via 
Johnson’s Russia List (JRL), 2009-#192, 19 Oct 09. 
(3) “Medvedev calls for economy reform,” 12 Nov 09, 11:58 GMT, BBC World 
News online via http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8356122.stm. 
(4) Ibid. 
(5) The ISCIP Analyst, Executive Branch, R-E-S-P-E-C-T by Susan J. Cavan, 
Volume XVI, Number 1, Part I (17 September 2009). 
(6) Article by President of the Russian Federation Dmitriy Medvedev, "Forward, 
Russia!" Gazeta.ru, 10 Sep 09 via JRL, 11 Sep 09, 2009-#169. 
(7) Ibid. 
(8) See recent appeals by Gleb Pavlovsky that Medvedev be allowed 
independence of action, Untitled interview by Boris Mezhuyev and Aleksandr 
Pavlov with Gleb Pavlovskiy, head of the Effective Policy Foundation, Kreml.org, 
11 Aug 09 via JRL, 2009-#151, 17 Aug 09; or recommendations from a 
Medvedev-connected think tank that the president move to set up his own “power 
vertical,” as discussed in “Your Own Power Vertical,” by Brian Whitmore in The 
Power Vertical Blog via 
http://www.rferl.org/archive/The_Power_Vertical/latest/884/884.html. 
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Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Rose Monacelli 
 
Communists seize the moment in an attempt to drive a wedge into the 
Putin-Medvedev partnership 
Russia’s Communist Party leadership declared last week that they prefer the 
politics and policies of current President Dmitri Medvedev to those of his 
predecessor, current Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. (1) Although the party had 
not given any indication that there was an impending announcement or shift in 
policy, the Communists have been unusually outspoken in recent weeks. 
 
Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov is considered one of the main 
instigators of last month’s Duma walk-out in protest of the widespread ballot 
tampering and electoral fraud that resulted in more than 7,000 United Russia 
party victories across the country. 135 members of the 450-seat Duma left during 
a meeting of the lower house of parliament. (2) The Communists, who claim to 
have suffered the greatest vote loss, due to alleged fraud in the contested 
elections, (3) also staged protests in cities across the country. Since October 
some have raised questions about why the parties involved chose this election, 
at this time, to take a stand against the government and United Russia. 
 
In response, more than 150,000 members of the Communist Party participated in 
marches around the country on November 7th to commemorate the anniversary 
of the October Revolution. The marches themselves are a form of anti-
government protest. In 2005 Putin designated November 4 as a day of Russian 
National Unity, which is marked by a re-enactment of the Red Square parade 
that took place on November 7, 1941 to bolster the Soviet forces’ morale in the 
war against Germany. (4) This year, the marchers expressed anger about the 
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government’s handling of mortgage fraud, widespread unemployment, and 
corruption at all levels of the public sector. More than anything else, however, 
protesters were eager to discuss their frustration with Putin and his handling of 
the government, but surprisingly, not with Medvedev. As one protester explained, 
“We consider Medvedev and Putin to be parts of one whole,” but “when 
Medvedev declared priorities that were so close to ours, we could not fail to 
appreciate it.” (5) A banner that read, “Putin is the main hurdle for the progress of 
Russia” articulated the party-leadership approved theme of the marches. (6) 
 
Following the November 7 marches, it has become apparent that the Communist 
party’s efforts are part of a wide attempt to drive a wedge between the President 
and the Prime Minister. When Zyuganov spoke at his party’s general assembly 
last week, he told the assembled Communist Party members that “the so-called 
tandem government of Mr. Putin and Mr. Medvedev was collapsing.” Zyuganov 
also offered the current President the support of the opposition “if he ever 
decides to go on a real but not declarative struggle for those principles that he 
stands for.” (7) The rumored rift between Medvedev and Putin may be 
exacerbated further when members of the opposition, especially Russia’s second 
largest and best-organized party, begin to take sides. Even though the 
Communists’ goals, which include mass nationalization, progressive income tax 
and a state monopoly on alcohol production and sales, (8) are not in line with 
Medvedev’s more liberal-leaning policies, it is likely that choosing a side early is 
the party’s way of ensuring greater presidential support if he wins the anticipated 
Presidential election showdown in 2012. Given the “controlled” element in 
Russian elections, demonstrating strength well before the vote provides a greater 
likelihood of success. The Communists currently control 57 seats, or 
approximately 13 percent of the Duma. 
 
Barring any unforeseen catastrophe, Russia’s next President likely will be either 
Putin or Medvedev. Even with the slight (and temporary) dip in approval ratings 
at the height of October’s elections scandal, Putin and Medvedev’s “trust” ratings 
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hover around 70 percent and 60 percent, respectively. (9) For his part, the 
President has denied the existence of any discord between himself and Putin. In 
a recent interview with the German publication Der Spiegel, Medvedev said that 
the two men would “sit down and discuss which one of us is going to run in the 
election – so that we don’t interfere with each other” but denied that that such a 
meeting would determine “who the next president will be.” (10) In September, 
Putin said that the two men would “come to an agreement because we are 
people of one blood and one political view.” (11) 
 
Beyond the obvious political maneuvering, the Communists’ recent actions are 
interesting because they suggest that the party’s leadership may believe that the 
time is right to seize any opportunity to advance their philosophy. The global 
economic crisis had a particularly devastating effect on Russia’s commodities-
based system, which has prompted a rise in nostalgia for a time when “the 
jobless rate was zero, food was cheap and social safety was high.” (12) This is 
clearly not just a Russian phenomenon; a BBC World Service survey from 
October found that 23 percent of the people surveyed across 27 countries 
believe that free market capitalism is fatally flawed and only 11 percent think that 
the current system works well. (13) The citizens of Russia, however, have even 
more to say on this subject. Those polled not only extolled the virtues of a more 
socialist system, but also indicated that they “would like their government to be 
more active in owning or directly controlling their country’s major industries.” (14) 
With these trends in mind, it is entirely possible to believe that the Communists 
are working to capitalize on the ever more popular feeling that the disintegration 
of the USSR was a mistake. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) Yulia Taranova, "For Russia's Communists, Ousting Putin is a Priority," New 
York Times, 7 Nov 09 via 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/08/world/europe/08russia.html. Last accessed 8 
Nov 09. 
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(2) Rose Monacelli, "A funeral for democracy," The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XVI, 
Number 4, Part 1, The Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology, and Policy, 29 
October 09 via http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol16/ed1604a.shtml#domestic. 
Last accessed 8 Nov 09. 
(3) Gleb Bryanski, "Russian communists flirt with Medvedev," Reuters, 7 Nov 09 
via http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE5A60VO20091107. Last 
accessed 8 Nov 09. 
(4) "Defiant Communists mark Russian Revolution anniversary," American 
Foreign Press, 7 Nov 09 via 
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jbXxqzMv7GM1c3a4h3S
R5cfHbWWQ. Last accessed 8 Nov 09. 
(5) “For Russia's Communists, Ousting Putin is a Priority," Ibid. 
(6) “Russian communists flirt with Medvedev," Ibid. 
(7) “For Russia's Communists, Ousting Putin is a Priority," Ibid. 
(8) “Russian communists flirt with Medvedev," Ibid. 
(9) “For Russia's Communists, Ousting Putin is a Priority," Ibid. 
(10) Georg Mascolo, Christian Neef, and Matthias Schepp, "The Fall of the Wall 
United Us Again," Spiegel Interview with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, 8 
Nov 09 via http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,660114-3,00.html. 
Last accessed 8 Nov 09. 
(11) "Medvedev: Hand-Picking the Next President is 'Funny,'" The Other Russia, 
8 Nov 09 via http://www.theotherrussia.org/2009/11/08/medvedev-hand-picking-
the-next-president-is-funny/. Last accessed 8 Nov 09. 
(12) Anna Mudeva, "Special Report: In Eastern Europe, people pine for 
socialism," 8 Nov 09 via 
http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE5A701320091108. Last 
accessed 8 Nov 09. 
(13) "Quarter of people say capitalism fatally flawed," Reuters, 8 Nov 09 via 
http://www.reuters.com/article/lifestyleMolt/idUSTRE5A800L20091109. Last 
accessed 8 Nov 09. 
(14) Ibid. 
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Russian Federation: Foreign and Security Issues 
By Fabian Adami 
 
START-Iran linkage? 
On December 5, 2009 the START I Treaty, signed in January 1991, will expire. 
The United States and Russia both have repeatedly expressed the desire either 
to extend or replace the agreement as soon as possible. In July 2009, President 
Barak Obama and President Dmitri Medvedev agreed on and signed the outlines 
of a new treaty, according to which both sides will reduce their deployed warhead 
numbers to below 1,700, with cuts to be achieved within seven years. (1) Since 
July, there have been two further sets of high-level talks between Russia and the 
US.  
 
First, in mid-October, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met with Foreign Minister 
Sergei Lavrov. Following their discussions, Lavrov claimed that although 
significant progress had been made and “consensus” reached on a number of 
important issues (2), the two sides still have major disagreements.  
 
Then, between 28th-29th October, US National Security Advisor General James 
Jones traveled to Moscow to continue talks with Lavrov. According to press 
reports after their meetings, it was in these sessions that the Foreign Minister 
explained two issues on which Russia is at odds with the United States: Moscow 
wants to link reductions in offensive and defensive weapons, (3) and table the 
discussion of “non nuclear strategic armaments,” (4) read ICBMs tipped with 
conventional munitions. The US apparently is considering assenting to the latter 
discussion. Russia opposes such weapons, because it believes that any 
imbalance in the field of strategic launch platforms is just as destabilizing to 
international security as a warhead imbalance. (5)  
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In order to ensure that these two issues do not become a major stumbling block 
preventing a new treaty, the United States and Russia are seeking an “executive 
agreement” (6) for the short term. START I specifies that verification and 
inspection teams must leave the signatory countries when the treaty expires, 
potentially leaving the two largest atomic arsenals in the world unmonitored, 
something which neither the Kremlin nor the White House claim would be an 
acceptable outcome.  
 
Lavrov has noted that the United States is taking Russia’s “concerns” on the 
aforementioned issues “into account” and is preparing “counter-proposals.” (7) 
Russia already has won one victory with the US abandonment of the European 
component of missile defense. Moscow may believe that it can gain more 
concessions because Washington, preoccupied as it is with the Iranian nuclear 
issue, might be willing to make further significant compromises in order to secure 
Russian acquiescence to sanctions in the UN Security Council, should they 
become necessary. Moscow obviously believes it has significant influence over 
Iran and is trying to sell its vote as expensively as possible. 
 
British-Russian talks 
On November 2, David Miliband (Britain’s Foreign Secretary) traveled to Russia 
for talks with Foreign Minister Lavrov. Miliband’s trip constituted the first time 
such a high level minister had been to Moscow since 2004. Relations between 
the UK and Russia have become steadily worse since the Litvinenko 
assassination in 2006, with Russia refusing to extradite Scotland Yard’s prime 
suspect (Andrei Lugovoi), closing down British Council offices across the country, 
demanding the extradition of Boris Berezovsky, and engaging in  “tit-for-tat 
diplomatic expulsions” with Britain. (8)  
As was to be expected (the 3rd anniversary of Litvinenko’s death is approaching) 
Miliband raised—and was rebutted on—the subject of Lugovoi’s extradition, (9) 
but otherwise attempted to focus on matters of mutual interest.  
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Prior to his departure for Moscow, Miliband expressed a desire to restart 
relations with Russia, noting that while the two countries do not always “see eye 
to eye,” they “share the same global challenges,” ones that need to be worked on 
“together.” (10) It appears, however, that Whitehall’s continued insistence on 
Lugovoi’s extradition is an obstacle that cannot be overcome. The talks produced 
few concrete results, with the two ministers simply signing several joint 
declarations agreeing to cooperate in Afghanistan, (11) to adhere to the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (12), to urge Iran to respond favorably to the IAEA’s 
proposals on nuclear fuel, and to work as part of the quartet for a Middle East 
peace settlement.  (13)  
 
The United Kingdom is scheduled to hold Parliamentary General Elections no 
later than June 2010. It is entirely possible that Russia is simply biding its time 
until then, in the hopes that a new government, whether Labor or Conservative 
(but more likely the latter), will be more pragmatic and drop the Lugovoi 
extradition request in favor of resuming normal relations. If this is the case, the 
Kremlin is likely to be disappointed: a Tory government touting itself as tough on 
law-and-order is unlikely to change Britain’s tune on so serious a subject as a 
nuclear assassination on its own soil.  
 
UAV’s for Border Service 
On 19th October, the FSB announced that a company named ZALA Aero 
Pilotless Systems had won the contract to supply the Border Service with 
unmanned aerial drones. The company will supply a mixture of fixed wing and 
rotary powered drones, able to carry a variety of sensors, including still cameras, 
color video cameras, and thermal imaging systems. (14) The aircraft will be able 
to transmit images over long distances, and will be used to prepare “special 
operations by day and night.” (15) What is not clear at the time of writing is 
whether these aircraft will be armed in the same way as the US Predator drone 
(and therefore capable of offensive operations and so-called targeted killings), or 
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whether they will be used simply to patrol and monitor Russia’s porous, lengthy 
and inhospitable border regions. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “US and Russia Agree Nuclear Cuts,” BBC News, 6 Jul 09 via 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8136918.stm. 
(2) “Russia, US Begin New Round Of Talks On Strategic Offensive Weapons,” 
ITAR-TASS, 19 Oct 09; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection.  
(3) “Russia: Clinton, Lavrov Views ‘Coincide’ on Iran, Differ on START, MD 
Report by Aleksandr Gabuyev: ‘We Are Not Requesting Anything of Each Other 
on Iran. Positions of Sergey Lavrov and Hillary Clinton Coincide Completely on 
All Nuclear Issues in Regard to Tehran,’” Kommersant, 23 Oct 09; OSC 
Translated Text via World News Connection. 
(4) “New Treaty May Resolve Problem of US Non-Nuclear Strategic Arms-
Lavrov,” Interfax, 2 Nov 09; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(5) Ibid.  
(6) “US Seeks ‘Bridge’ on Arms Pact; As End of Treaty Nears, Negotiators 
Consider Ways to Keep On-Site Inspectors,” The International Herald Tribune, 
20 Oct 09 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(7) “Russia, USA Should Negotiate Easier Terms For New Start Treaty—Lavrov,” 
ITAR-TASS, 27 Oct 09; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(8) “Miliband Hails Links With Russia,” BBC News, 2 Nov 09 via 
www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8337484.stm. 
(9) “Miliband Met By Icy Reception on Debut Mission to Moscow,” The 
Independent, 2 Nov 09 via 
www.independent.co.uk/./news/world/europe/miliband-met-by-icy-reception-on-
debut-mission-to-moscow-1813638.html  
(10) “Miliband Hails Links With Russia,” BBC News, 2 Nov 09 via 
www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8337484.stm. 
(11) “Analysis: Miliband Visits Russia to Thaw Frosty Ties, Yet Differences 
Remain,” Xinhua, 2 Nov 09; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
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(12) “UK-Russia Committed to Non-Proliferation Treaty,” Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office, 3 Nov 09 via www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-
news/?view=PressS&id=21123838. 
(13) “Analysis: Miliband Visits Russia to Thaw Frosty Ties, Yet Differences 
Remain,” Xinhua, 2 Nov 09; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(14) “Russian Paper Views Military Applications of UAVs, Potential 
Countermeasures,” Vremya novostey website, Moscow, in Russian, 19 Oct 09; 
BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(15) “Russian Company to Supply Drones to Federal Border Guards Service,” 
Interfax-AVN Online Military News Agency website, Moscow, in Russian, 19 Oct 
09; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Andrew Wallace (USAF) 
 
President Medvedev focuses on defense industry 
The Russian armed forces are making progress in instituting major reforms.  
According to President Medvedev, the military plans to complete organizational 
reforms by the end of the year and to equip the armed forces with modernized 
equipment and weapons by 2012. (1)  Although the armed forces are making 
progress, a weak Russian defense industry, including an exodus of defense 
specialists, may impede the pace of future progress.  
 
On October 26, Russian President Medvedev held a meeting on defense industry 
development in Moscow.  During his opening comments, the President 
articulated concern with the poor performance of the Russian defense industry, 
stating, “How can we plan strategy and tactics if our arms are inferior?” (2)  The 
impetus for his comment were a number of “serious issues” (3) raised during a 
conference with military generals following Zapad 2009 (a strategic military 
exercise held in late September). (4)  President Medvedev further identified six 
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issues the military-industrial complex must address in order to meet the nation’s 
security needs.  They include obtaining a greater return on defense investment, 
controlling pricing, improving laws regulating state defense procurement, 
boosting investment in relevant new technologies, executing an industry strategy 
that provides modern arms to the reorganized armed forces and bolstering the 
industry’s arms export business. (5) 
 
The President’s goal for the meeting was to analyze “prospects” for development, 
to “examine specific measures” to make the industry more competitive and to 
enable the development of new and innovative weapons for the armed forces. (6)  
The Russian President’s direct involvement in the defense industry comes at a 
time when nearly a third of all defense enterprises are reporting negative 
financial indicators or are on the verge of bankruptcy. (7)  Not only is the industry 
plagued with serious financial problems, it also faces significant productivity 
issues.  According to Chairman of the Russian Public Chamber Commission for 
the Affairs of Veterans, Service Members, and their Families Aleksandr 
Kanyshin, “the labor productivity indicators [show] Russian defense companies 
are falling behind their foreign competitors in various areas by 5-15 times.” (8) 
 
One striking example of the industry’s inefficiency centers on the research and 
development of the new Russian uniform.  According to Russian Public Chamber 
expert consultant Vladimir Bogatyrev, “Many research and development works, 
which started in 1993, are dragging out, and there is no simultaneous 
development of about 60 elements of the new uniform.  Thus, the deliveries to 
military districts have not yet begun.” (9)  After waiting seventeen years for a new 
military uniform that still has not entered production, it is understandable why 
Russia’s military leaders are concerned. 
 
To add to the list of industry woes, the sector also is facing a significant loss of 
specialists.  According to Bogatyrev, “the pay in the defense industry is still lower 
than in civilian companies…[consequently] there is a steady massive outflow of 
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specialists, especially young ones.” (10)  Bogatyrev further elaborated that the 
defense industry is rapidly aging and the average age of a Russian defense 
worker is approaching 50 years. (11)  This trend is problematic not only for the 
defense sector, but for Russia as a whole.  As Chairman Kanyshin points out, 
“the defense [industrial] complex accounts for around 70% of all Russian-made 
high-tech products and approximately 50% of [the] researchers.” (12)  
 
Even if the defense industry were to increase salaries to attract new scientists 
and tech-savvy specialists, it might not be enough to remedy the shortfall.  The 
“brain drain” phenomenon is not unique to the defense industry.  It is a challenge 
the Russian scientific community is facing, as well.  According to a recent poll, 
nearly 33% of all Russian university graduates earning a science degree would 
like to work abroad and only 2% of graduates want to work in their field. (13)  To 
make matters worse, Russia is planning to cut 16.6 billion rubles from its 2010 
Academy of Sciences budget. (14)  These indicators point toward a very 
uncertain future for Russia’s innovative high-tech defense industry.  
 
To address the challenges facing the defense industry, President Medvedev 
ordered the establishment of a ranking defense industry working group by 
December 1. (15)  According to Deputy Prime Minister Ivanov, “the main purpose 
of the [working group for modernization and innovation development of the 
defense industry] is equipping the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation with 
contemporary armaments and military equipment.” (16)  Until the group forms 
and makes substantive changes to the defense industry, one question remains.  
Will President Medvedev’s recent public interest provide the new working group 
with enough influence to modernize and reform Russia’s floundering defense 
industry? 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “Russian president’s remarks at meeting on defence industry development,” 
President of Russia website, 27 Oct 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
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(2) Ibid. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) “Zapad-2009 drill reveals shortcomings in new brigade structure – Russian 
Paper, Vedomosti, 2 Oct 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic; “Russian president’s 
remarks at meeting on defence industry development,” President of Russia 
website, 27 Oct 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(5) “Russian president’s remarks,” Ibid.  
(6) “Russian president’s remarks,” Ibid. 
(7) “Russia:  Public Chamber Meetings Discuss Defense Industry Issues,” 
Voyenno-Promyshlennyy kuryer, 28 Oct 09; OSCE Translated Excerpt via World 
News Connection. 
(8) Ibid. 
(9) “Further Delays to New Russian Servicemen Uniform,” Interfax, 29 Oct 09; 
OSCE Translated Excerpt via World News Connection. 
(10)  “Russia:  Public Chamber Meetings,” Ibid. 
(11) Ibid. 
(12) Ibid. 
(13) “Brain Drain Continues to plague Russia,” www.russiatoday.com, 3 Nov 09; 
via Johnson’s Russia List #201. 
(14) “Russia May Face Brain Drain Amid Crisis -  Academician, ITAR-TASS, 2 
Nov 09; via Johnson’s Russia List #201. 
(15) “Working Group To Modernize Defence Industry Complex To Be Set Up,” 
ITAR-TASS, 2 Nov 09; OSCE Translated Excerpt via World News Connection. 
(16) Ibid. 
 
The thoughts and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and 
do not necessarily reflect the official position of the United States Air Force, 
Department of Defense, or the United States government. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Energy Politics 
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By Creelea Henderson 
 
Poland’s dilemma 
In late October Poland’s gas monopoly PGNiG signed an agreement to increase 
natural gas purchases from Russia’s gas monopoly Gazprom from last year’s 
level of about 7 billion cubic meters to nearly 11 billion cubic meters a year 
through 2037. (1) In signing the supply agreement with Russia, Poland is taking a 
calculated risk. Although the country will rely increasingly upon Russian gas 
supplies in coming years as it transitions away from coal power generation, the 
Polish government may hesitate before endorsing a new contract with Gazprom. 
Last year PGNiG committed to reducing Poland’s dependence upon Russian 
imports to 40 percent by 2015. (2) That target will be hard to meet under the 
terms envisaged in the new agreement, wherein Russian gas volumes will make 
up about 80 percent of Poland’s total consumption. Even if Poland’s consumption 
increases to 18 billion cubic meters by 2015 as projected, Russian gas volumes 
still will comprise over 60 percent of Poland’s annual supply. (3) Moreover, it is 
unclear where Poland could secure the additional gas volumes, if not from 
Russia. 
 
The new supply agreement comes at a moment of ticklish relations between the 
two countries. In September, as the Obama administration announced 
Washington’s withdrawal from a Bush-era missile defense program in eastern 
Europe, the Russian military launched a simulated nuclear attack on Poland and 
targeted Polish gas pipelines in war games conducted jointly with Belarus. (4) On 
a visit to Washington earlier this month, Polish foreign minister Radek Sikorski, 
sought “some strategic reassurance” from US and NATO that his country would 
be shielded from Russian aggression, a plea that a Russian parliamentarian 
called “absolutely unacceptable.” (5) 
 
Nor are Polish security concerns confined to Russian military posturing. In the 
realm of energy, the resource flow is shifting in directions that threaten to leave 
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Poland vulnerable to Russian price and supply manipulations. In the two 
countries’ original supply scheme, Poland occupied a key position in a gas 
transportation network that prospectively would stretch from Russia’s northern 
Yamal peninsula through Belarus and Poland to end in Germany. The Yamal-
Europe pipeline, jointly owned by PGNiG and Gazprom, came online in 1997 
carrying gas from fields in western Siberia, but the line never reached as far as 
the Yamal peninsula, where Russia’s largest gas reserves are located. 
 
In 2007, Gazprom abandoned plans to build a second branch of the pipeline in 
favor of a new project, the Nord Stream pipeline, projected to carry Russian gas 
along the Baltic seabed directly to downstream markets in Germany, completely 
bypassing Poland. (6) This month Nord Stream cleared the last political hurdles 
to construction, when Sweden and Finland joined Denmark in approving the 
project. (7) The undersea pipeline is scheduled to come online sometime in late 
2011 or early 2012. (8) 
 
In Poland, the development of the Nord Stream pipeline project is seen as cause 
for alarm. Sikorski, at the time when he served as Poland’s defense minister, 
characterized negotiations between Gazprom and its German partners as 
another Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, like the 1939 agreement in which the USSR 
and Nazi Germany colluded to divide up Poland. (9) Polish officials clearly are 
worried that once the country is no longer host to a conduit through which 
Russian gas must pass on its way to favored German markets downstream, 
Gazprom will not hesitate to cut off Poland’s energy supply, should political 
tensions run high. Given Russia’s recent war game scenarios, political 
antagonism seems all too imminent. Nevertheless, in recent weeks the Polish 
government has played down anxieties over what is increasingly seen as the 
inevitable progress of the Nord Stream pipeline. During a recent meeting with his 
Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk remarked 
that the new pipeline was “not an important element of Russian-Polish relations,” 
and is ultimately “an issue between German and Russian companies.” (10) Tusk 
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even suggested that Poland could become a critical partner in the project, 
although he reiterated Poland’s strong preference for a reinvigoration of the 
Yamal-Europe gas route. With the onrush of momentum following the formal go 
ahead by Denmark, Sweden and Finland, Nord Stream does not face any 
serious obstacles from Poland, nor does Poland have any particular sway over 
its remote route. In the absence of a clear alternative, Poland will have to come 
to terms with a new energy supply dynamic during the 27-year period covered by 
the recent PGNiG-Gazprom supply contract, an arrangement that appears to 
give Russia a substantially magnified degree of leverage over its downstream 
customers. Poland’s supply of natural gas through 2037 depends upon the 
continued good will of Russia, something that country has yet to demonstrate. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “Gazprom and PGNiG settle cooperation issues in gas sector,” Gazprom 
company website, 30 Oct 09 Via 
(http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2009/october/article70291/). 
(2) “2ndUPDATE: Polish Govt To OK Gas Deal With Russia Within Wks,” The 
Wall Street Journal, 4 Nov 09 via (http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20091104-
712512.html). 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) “Russia Practices Nuclear Attack On Poland,” London Daily Telegraph, 2 Nov 
09 Via 
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/poland/6480227/Russia-
simulates-nuclear-attack-on-Poland.html). 
(5) “Russia astonished by Poland's U.S.-NATO statement,” 6 Nov 09 Via 
(http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-11/06/content_12401201.htm). 
(6) “Russia drops second leg of gas pipeline via Belarus,” RiaNovosti, 1 Nov 07 
Via (http://en.rian.ru/russia/20071101/86223448.html). 
(7) “Sweden and Finland clear Nord Stream plan,” The Financial Times, 6 Nov 09 
Via (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/102d424c-cade-11de-97e0-00144feabdc0.html). 
 20 
(8) Nord Stream company website, Via (http://www.nord-stream.com/our-
company/shareholders/gazprom.html). 
(9) “Why Russia's Nord Stream is winning the pipeline race,” European Voice, 29 
Jan 09 Via (http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/why-russia%27s-
nord-stream-is-winning-the-pipeline-race/63780.aspx). 
(10) “Russia & CIS Oil and Gas Weekly,” Interfax, 2 Sep 09 Via Lexis-Nexis 
Academic Universe. 
 
 
Copyright Boston University Trustees 2009 
Unless otherwise indicated, all articles appearing in this journal were written especially for 
Analyst. This article was originally published at 
http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol16/ed1605a.shtml. 
